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INTRODUCTION 
he issue of judicial recusal has become front-page news.  House 
Democrats have called on Justice Thomas to recuse himself from 
cases challenging the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act1 because of his wife’s role as a paid lobbyist 
against that Act.2  Republicans are calling for the recusal of Justice 
 
∗ Clinical Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  The author would like to thank 
her research assistants and the law school for their support.  She is especially grateful to 
her husband, Professor Theodore Seto, for everything. 
1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.). 
2 Felicia Sonmez, House Democrats Say Justice Thomas Should Recuse Himself in 
Health-Care Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2011, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44 
/2011/02/house-democrats-say-justice-th.html. 
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Kagan from the same cases because of her service as Solicitor 
General when the Obama administration was considering how to 
structure health care reform legislation to survive constitutional 
challenge.3  Over the past two centuries, judicial recusal standards 
have been tightened repeatedly.  Nevertheless, in case after high-
profile case, they still sometimes fail to ensure the kind of 
legitimating impartiality we demand of our courts. 
In the meantime, psychology has expanded the range of tools 
available for making the “realistic appraisal of psychological 
tendencies and human weakness”4 believed relevant to understanding 
when recusal is warranted.  We are at least beginning to understand 
the role of heuristics in human judgment—heuristics that sometimes 
trigger cognitive illusions and faulty decision making.  Such illusions 
are particularly problematic when a judge is called upon to decide 
whether he can decide impartially—in effect, to decide whether he is 
competent to perform, in a particular case, the role to which he has 
dedicated his life.  Finally, the past decade has seen widespread use of 
statistical data to advance our understanding of how courts function.  
To date, no such data have been reported with regard to how judicial 
recusal and disqualification actually operate in the federal courts. 
This Article reports preliminary results of a survey of the 1080 
cases decided between 1980 and 2007, inclusive, in which U.S. courts 
of appeals reviewed decisions by U.S. district court judges not to 
recuse themselves.  The overall reversal rate over that twenty-eight-
year period was only 8.1%—relatively low.  Reversal rates were 
somewhat higher in criminal cases (10.3%) than in civil cases (6.3%).  
They did not appear to depend on whether the recusal issue was first 
raised while the case was pending (8.7%) or after judgment was 
entered (7.0%).  There was a marked jump in recusal appeals in 2001, 
but no corresponding jump in reversals.  Interestingly, reversal rates 
varied markedly from circuit to circuit, from a high of 21% in the 
Third Circuit to a low of 0% in the Federal Circuit. 
Researchers coded the cases by ground or grounds asserted for 
recusal.  “General bias against a party” accounted for thirty-five 
reversals (40% of all reversals), the largest number of any ground 
asserted.  Nevertheless, that category recorded a reversal rate of only 
7.7%.  The two sets of grounds for which research showed the highest 
 
3 See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Sen. Hatch: Kagan Should Sit out Health Care Case, ABC 
NEWS, Feb. 4, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=12843110. 
4 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
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reversal rates were (1) the trial judge was legally prohibited from 
hearing the case (19.2%) and (2) the trial judge had some special 
relationship, positive or negative, with an attorney appearing in the 
case (general bias against counsel: 16.7%; personal relationship with 
counsel: 16.2%; professional relationship with counsel: 14.0%).  The 
two sets of grounds for which research showed the lowest reversal 
rates were (1) racial bias (racial bias against party: 4.0%; racial bias 
against counsel: 0%) and (2) prior adverse rulings (adverse rulings: 
3.1%; procedural dismissal or remand: 0.8%). 
What we do not yet have is a comparable data set for recusal 
decisions, for or against, where parties have not appealed the 
decisions from the district courts.  Such decisions are typically not 
reported.  Nor are judges’ affirmative decisions to recuse themselves 
appealable.  We therefore do not have a comparable set of appellate 
decisions exploring the flip side of the question—when judges have a 
duty to sit.  (Only ten court of appeals decisions in the sample 
addressed duty-to-sit issues.)  For these reasons, and because the 
present study is exploratory and was not designed to test specific 
hypotheses, this Article does not offer formal statistical analyses.  
Instead, it reports and discusses the data in historical and behavioral 
contexts. 
Part I outlines recent cases and developments in the area.  The 
situation, suffice it to say, is not completely satisfactory.  As one 
commentator has observed, “The laws governing judicial recusal are 
failing at one of their primary objectives: protecting the reputation of 
the judiciary.”5  Part II explores the history of the law of judicial 
recusal.  Even today, standards and procedures are unclear, affording 
enormous discretion to judges, who are asked to apply recusal rules 
impartially to themselves.  Part III discusses developments in human 
decision-making theory that may begin to identify contexts in which 
judges are least likely to be able to apply the recusal rules objectively 
to themselves.  Part IV presents the results of a survey of U.S. 
appellate court cases decided between 1980 and 2007 on appeals from 
refusals of district court judges to recuse themselves.  The data 
suggest that the enormous discretion currently given judges has 
resulted in substantial geographic disparity in application of the 
rules—that is, in different recusal cultures, circuit to circuit.  The data 
also appear to be consistent with predictions behavioral theory might 
 
5 Amanda Frost, Keeping up Appearances: A Process-Oriented Approach to Judicial 
Recusal, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 531, 531 (2005). 
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make as to when judges are less likely to be able to make objectively 
defensible assessments of their own abilities to decide impartially.  
Part V, finally, concludes and outlines future possible work in the 
area. 
I 
RECENT CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS 
One of the most widely publicized recent recusal controversies 
involved Justice Antonin Scalia of the U.S. Supreme Court.  In 2004, 
Justice Scalia declined to recuse himself in a case to which Vice 
President Dick Cheney, a longtime friend, was a party, Cheney v. 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia.6  Three 
weeks after certiorari was granted at Cheney’s request, Cheney flew 
Scalia, his son, and his son-in-law from Washington to Patterson, 
Louisiana, without charge in a government-owned Gulfstream jet; the 
four of them joined another nine guests on a three-day duck-hunting 
trip in Louisiana.7  The Sierra Club moved for recusal.8  Justice Scalia 
refused and took the unusual step of filing an opinion explaining his 
refusal.9  He noted that a rule requiring Justices to recuse themselves 
whenever personal friends were named parties in their official 
capacities would be disabling (invoking, in effect, the duty to sit).10  
He concluded, 
The question, simply put, is whether someone who thought I could 
decide this case impartially despite my friendship with the Vice 
President would reasonably believe that I cannot decide it 
impartially because I went hunting with that friend and accepted an 
invitation to fly there with him on a Government plane.  If it is 
reasonable to think that a Supreme Court Justice can be bought so 
cheap, the Nation is in deeper trouble than I had imagined.11 
His decision was widely criticized.12 
 
6 Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for D.C. (Cheney I), 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (Scalia, J.) 
(explaining why he did not recuse himself from Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the 
District of .Columbia (Cheney II), 542 U.S. 367 (2004)). 
7 Cheney I, 541 U.S. at 914–15. 
8 Id. at 913. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 916. 
11 Id. at 928–29. 
12 See, e.g., David Feldman, Note, Duck Hunting, Deliberating, and Disqualification: 
Cheney v. U.S. District Court and the Flaws of 28 U.S.C. § 455(A), 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
319, 319 (2006); Frost, supra note 5, at 531; Jeffrey M. Hayes, To Recuse or to Refuse: 
Self-Judging and the Reasonable Person Problem, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 85, 102 (2008); 
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In another recent high-profile case, the “Jena 6” case, Judge 
Mauffray referred to the six African American teenage defendants, 
charged with attempted murder for allegedly beating a white 
classmate unconscious, as “troublemakers” and “a violent bunch.”13  
The judge insisted he could remain impartial; a fellow district court 
judge, however, concluded that he should be disqualified.14 
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Massey’s president, Don 
Blankenship, contributed three million dollars to the campaign of 
Brent Benjamin, who was running for a seat on the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals.15  Blankenship’s donations accounted for 
over two-thirds of Benjamin’s total campaign funds.16  Benjamin was 
successful in the election, took the bench, and joined a majority of the 
court in overturning a fifty-million-dollar damage award against 
Massey.17  Caperton sought rehearing, requesting disqualification of 
Justice Benjamin and one other justice, Justice Maynard.18  (Justice 
Maynard had been photographed vacationing on the French Riviera 
with Blankenship while the case was pending.)19 
Massey, in turn, sought disqualification of yet a third justice, 
Justice Starcher, who had publicly criticized Blankenship’s role in 
Justice Benjamin’s election.20  Justices Maynard and Starcher recused 
themselves, but Justice Benjamin refused to do so.21  Reversing the 
state supreme court, the U.S. Supreme Court held that due process 
required recusal, observing there was a “serious risk of actual bias . . . 
when a person with a personal stake in a particular case had a 
significant and disproportionate influence in placing the judge on the 
case by raising funds . . . when the case was pending or imminent.”22  
The U.S. Supreme Court therefore reinstated the fifty-million-dollar 
award against Massey. 
 
Jeremy M. Miller, Judicial Recusal and Disqualification: The Need for a Per Se Rule on 
Friendship (Not Acquaintance), 33 PEPP. L. REV. 575, 611 (2006). 
13 Judge Ousted for Remarks, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 2008, http://www.chicagotribune 
.com/news/nationworld/chi-nat_jena-sixaug02,0,3313978.story. 
14 Judge Taken Off Remaining ‘Jena 6’ Cases, CNN, Aug. 1, 2008, http://www.cnn 
.com/2008/CRIME/08/01/jena6.appeal/index.html. 
15 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009). 
16 Id. 
17 Id. at 2257–58. 
18 Id. at 2258. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 2263–64. 
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Judicial disqualification issues arise in less high-profile 
proceedings as well.  In 2008, in McKinney, Texas, a defendant 
requested a new trial after discovering that the judge and prosecutor 
in his case had been having an affair during the period leading up to 
his trial.23  At trial, the defendant was convicted of murder and 
sentenced to death.24  While both judge and prosecutor admitted to 
the affair, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals rejected the 
defendant’s request for a new trial on the ground that he should have 
raised the issue earlier.25  The court’s opinion did not explore whether 
the affair prejudiced his trial.26 
A study on the effect of campaign contributions on decisions by the 
Ohio Supreme Court found that, in 200 out of 1500 cases involving 
significant campaign contributions (over $1000) during the twelve-
year period studied, the justice receiving the funds failed to recuse 
himself from the case.27  Of the ten justices studied, six sided with 
their contributors more than seventy percent of the time.28  In a class 
action against DaimlerChrysler, two Ohio Supreme Court justices 
each received $1000 in campaign contributions from the company 
while the case was pending before them.29  They joined the majority, 
ruling in favor of DaimlerChrysler.30 
There is some evidence that the most biased judges may be least 
willing to recuse themselves.31  Others are reluctant to recuse 
themselves on the ground that they are already required to act in a 
way “that promotes independence, integrity, and impartiality of the 
judiciary” and, of course, do so.32  In a majority of states, as in the 
 
23 Ex parte Hood (Hood I), No. WR-41168-11, 2008 WL 4946276, at *1 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Nov. 19, 2008). 
24 Id. 
25 Ex parte Hood (Hood II), No. WR-41168-11, 2009 WL 2963854, at *1 (Tex. Crim. 
App. Sept. 16, 2009); Hood I, 2008 WL 4946276, at *2. 
26 James C. McKinley, Jr., Judge-Prosecutor Affair, but No New Trial in Texas Death 
Penalty Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/17/us 
/17texas.html?scp=1&sq=&st=nyt. 
27 Adam Liptak & Janet Roberts, Campaign Cash Mirrors a High Court’s Rulings, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2006, at 22. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE 
JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT 14 (2008) [hereinafter JUDICIAL 
DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT], available at http://www.ajs.org/ethics/pdfs/ABAJudicial 
disqualificationproject report.pdf. 
32 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 (2007). 
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federal courts, recusal or disqualification motions are still reviewed 
by the target judge.33  In a minority of states, a different judge rules 
on the disqualification motion,34 acknowledging, in effect, that the 
problems inherent in judicial recusal decisions are worse when judges 
are required to judge themselves.  A third approach is to allow the 
target judge to review the motion for legal sufficiency but ask a 
different judge to review the motion on the merits.35 
Due to recent publicity about the effects of campaign contributions, 
a few states have revised their recusal and disqualification rules.  On 
November 5, 2009, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted new formal 
rules.36  Previously, justices on the court had followed an unwritten 
rule requiring them to step down in the event of a conflict of 
interest.37  Under the new rules, if there is a suggestion of impropriety 
or bias and the justice decides not to recuse himself, the other justices 
on the court can review that decision.38  In structuring the new rules, 
however, the court declined to require parties to disclose campaign 
contributions made to specific justices.39 
Wisconsin’s highest court recently ruled that recusal is not 
automatically required when a judge or justice receives campaign 
contributions from a party before the court.40  The court emphasized 
the need to protect First Amendment rights, reasoning that a judge’s 
campaign activities are protected speech.41  If the public was not 
happy with the results, the court noted, it could remove the offending 
judge at the ballot box.42 
Finally, on February 23, 2011, in anticipation of controversy over 
whether Justices Thomas and Kagan should participate in hearing 
cases challenging the new health care Act, over one hundred law 
 
33 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 31, at 31. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Michigan Supreme Court Adopts Disqualification Rules, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 5, 2009, 
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/nov/05/local/chi-ap-mi-judicialethics-ru. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Alex De Grand, In Battle over Judicial Recusal, First Amendment Trumped Due 
Process Rights, WISBAR INSIDETRACK (Nov. 4, 2009), http://www.wisbar.org/AM 
/template.cfm?section=insidetrack&template=/customsource/insidetrack/index.cfm 
(follow “Archive” hyperlink, then follow “November 4, 2009” hyperlink). 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
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professors asked Congress to set neutral standards for Supreme Court 
recusals.43 
II 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL RECUSAL AND 
DISQUALIFICATION 
In the early English common law, it was simply assumed that a 
judge would abide by his oath to decide impartially in all cases.44  To 
question his neutrality was to question his integrity.  It is not clear that 
modern law has entirely escaped this conceptual frame.  Every federal 
judge is required to take an oath that he will “faithfully and 
impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon 
[himself].”45  A motion to recuse necessarily questions his fidelity to 
that oath. 
Perhaps as a result, the early law of recusal in the United States 
operated only in very limited circumstances.46  Even actual bias was 
not a basis for disqualification.47  Only situations and cases that 
demonstrated a blatantly palpable sense of impropriety were 
addressed.48  It was said that a man could not be a judge in his own 
case.  In addition, a judge could be disqualified for having a financial 
interest in the case.49  Otherwise, the judge’s oath assured 
impartiality. 
In 1792, Congress codified the common law of judicial 
disqualification as it then existed: a judge could be disqualified if he 
was “concerned in interest” or if he had “been of counsel for either 
party.”50  Over time, Congress has modified and added to this simple 
provision.  In 1891, it enacted 28 U.S.C § 47, which provides that 
“[n]o judge shall hear or determine an appeal from the decision of a 
 
43 R. Jeffrey Smith, Professors Ask Congress for an Ethics Code for Supreme Court, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article 
/2011/02/23/AR2011022304975.html. 
44 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 31, at 6. 
45 Caprice L. Roberts, The Fox Guarding the Henhouse?: Recusal and the Procedural 
Void in the Court of Last Resort, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 107, 135 (2004). 
46 JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION PROJECT, supra note 31, at 4. 
47 Id. at 7. 
48 Id. at 6–7. 
49 Id. at 7. 
50 Id. 
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case or issue tried by him.”51  Its purpose was to prevent trial judges 
from hearing appeals from their own decisions.52 
In 1911, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. § 144, which allowed, and still 
theoretically allows, peremptory challenges of district court judges for 
“personal bias or prejudice”: 
 Whenever a party to any proceeding in a district court makes and 
files a timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the 
matter is pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him 
or in favor of any adverse party, such judge shall proceed no further 
therein, but another judge shall be assigned to hear such proceeding. 
 The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief 
that bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed not less than ten days 
before the beginning of the term at which the proceeding is to be 
heard, or good cause shall be shown for failure to file it within such 
time.  A party may file only one such affidavit in any case.  It shall 
be accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record stating that it is 
made in good faith.53 
Congress’s intention was clear.  Nevertheless, § 144 
disqualifications are rare.  Although some have suggested that the 
statute is being “eviscerated by judicial interpretation,”54 courts have 
not been obviously hostile to its enforcement.  In Berger v. United 
States, for example, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the 
Government’s suggestion that 
the motion and its supporting affidavit, like other motions and their 
supporting evidence, are submitted for decision and the exercise of 
the judicial judgment upon them.  In other words, the action of the 
affidavit is not “automatic,” to quote the Solicitor General, but 
depends upon the substance and merit of its reasons and the truth of 
its facts, and upon both the judge has jurisdiction to pass.55 
The Court accepted instead the defendants’ assertion “that the 
mandate of the section is not subject to the discretion or judgment of 
the [target] judge.”56 
The problem appears to lie in the structure of the statute itself.  The 
statute requires an allegation of actual “personal bias or prejudice” 
and a statement of facts supporting that allegation.57  Judges are 
 
51 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. § 144. 
54 Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with Federal Judicial Disqualification 
Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751, 763 (2010). 
55 Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 30–31 (1921). 
56 Id. at 30. 
57 28 U.S.C. § 144. 
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rarely imprudent enough to supply such facts.  In addition, the 
affidavit must normally be filed at least ten days before the term in 
which the case is to be heard.58  The mere fact that a judge develops 
views adverse to the complaining party as a result of evidence taken 
in the trial is not enough.59  Even actual and unlawful bias is not 
enough, unless good cause is shown for the moving party’s failure to 
have filed the necessary papers prior to the start of term.  In any 
event, § 144 only applies to trial judges. 
By contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 455 applies to all federal judges, trial and 
appellate.  The initial version, enacted in 1948, provided, 
Any justice or judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in 
any case in which he has a substantial interest, has been of counsel, 
is or has been a material witness, or is so related to or connected 
with any party or his attorney as to render it improper, in his 
opinion, for him to sit on the trial, appeal, or other proceeding 
therein.60 
Over the ensuing decades, Congress came to perceive three 
problems with this initial version.61  First, the phrase “in his opinion” 
appeared to delegate to the target judge himself almost complete 
discretion in applying the rule.62  Second, the phrase “is so related to 
or connected with any party or his attorney as to render it improper” 
was so vague as to have little practical effect.63  Finally, the courts 
quickly added a “duty to sit,” creating a strong countervailing 
criterion that limited the section’s effectiveness.64 
In 1972, the American Bar Association issued a Code of Judicial 
Conduct, which the Judicial Conference adopted a year later, with 
minor modifications, as the Code of Conduct of U.S. Judges.65  In 
 
58 Id. 
59 Berger, 255 U.S. at 31. 
60 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1970). 
61 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., RECUSAL: ANALYSIS OF CASE LAW UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 455 & 
144, at 2 (2002). 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Canon 3C (1972) (current version at MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, R. 2.11 (2007)); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 9–
11 (1973), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/JudicialConference 
/Proceedings/Proceedings.aspx?doc=/uscourts/FederalCourts/judconf/proceedings/1973    
-04.pdf. 
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1974, Congress enacted substantial revisions to § 455 to parallel 
Canon 3C of that Code.66 
The section currently requires recusal in two different, somewhat 
overlapping situations.67  Subsection (a) requires that a judge recuse 
himself where his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” for 
any reason, not merely because of his relationship to a party or his 
counsel.68  Congress intended to make clear that an appearance of 
partiality would be enough to require recusal; actual impropriety was 
not necessary.69  In addition, the new language was framed in 
objective terms, deleting language suggesting that a judge need only 
recuse himself if “in his opinion,” it was inappropriate to continue.70  
Congress’s purpose, following the lead of the ABA, was to build up 
the public’s confidence in the judicial system, which had been shaken 
in the past.71 
The current appearance-based standard and the old probability-of-
bias standard are profoundly different in approach.  The appearance-
based standard of current § 455 focuses on the public’s perception of 
the court, whereas the probability-of-bias standard focused on actual 
likelihood of bias.72  Even today, however, the probability-of-bias 
standard often seems to be applied in place of the required 
appearance-based standard.73 
The second part of § 455, subsection (b), lists five specific 
circumstances in which a judge’s recusal is required: 
 (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts 
concerning the proceeding; 
 (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter 
in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law 
served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or 
the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; 
 
66 Frost, supra note 5, at 546. 
67 Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek 
Behind Closed Doors, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 192 (2007). 
68 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
69 Feldman, supra note 12, at 326–27. 
70 Matthew E. Kaplan, Comment, Judicial Process at Risk: Scales of Justice Unequal 
Under Present Federal Judicial Disqualification Statutes, 8 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 
284 (2000). 
71 Frost, supra note 5, at 546–47. 
72 Dmitry Bam, Note, Understanding Caperton: Judicial Disqualification Under the 
Due Process Clause, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 65, 75 (2010). 
73 Id. 
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 (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in 
such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness 
concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the 
merits of the particular case in controversy; 
 (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his 
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial 
interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the 
proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected 
by the outcome of the proceeding; 
 (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of 
relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: 
 (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party; 
 (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
 (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
 (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness 
in the proceeding.74 
The financial interest restriction of § 455(b)(4) has been the subject 
of more controversy than other parts of that subsection.75  This is due 
in part to the breadth of the definition of “financial interest”: 
“ownership of a legal or equitable interest, however small.”76  Under 
this definition, a judge owning a single share of stock has a financial 
interest.77  Even if a judge does not recall owning that share, hearing 
the case in such circumstances is a violation of § 455(b)(4).78  In 
addition, the statute prohibits not merely a financial interest in the 
judge himself, but also in the judge’s spouse or any of his minor 
children that live in his household.79  Lapses of memory make 
inadvertent violations of this subsection difficult to avoid. 
Section 455(b)(1) (“Where he has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary 
facts concerning the proceeding”) triggers serious practical and 
empirical problems.  District court judges are unlikely to admit actual 
bias; moving parties may therefore be reluctant to assert actual bias as 
 
74 28 U.S.C. § 455(b) (2006). 
75 Hellman, supra note 67, at 196. 
76 28 U.S.C. § 455(d)(4) (emphasis added); Hellman, supra note 67, at 192. 
77 Hellman, supra note 67, at 192. 
78 Id. at 193. 
79 Id. at 192. 
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their ground for recusal.80  Subsection (a), by contrast, covers the 
same set of issues by focusing on appearances; to recuse himself 
under subsection (a) a judge need not admit actual bias. He need 
merely note that a reasonable person might perceive the possibility of 
bias, however unwarranted that perception might be.  Appellate court 
analyses, in turn, often conflate the two—perhaps in part to avoid 
having to impugn the target judge.  In any event, separately coding 
the two is extremely difficult; the study reported here does not 
attempt to do so. 
The remaining subsections of § 455(b) have not generated much 
controversy in the case law.81  Each addresses a kind of conflict that 
is normally fairly obvious: for example, where a party in the 
proceeding is a close relative of the judge or where the judge has 
previously served as counsel for one of the parties.82 
Finally, the legislative history to the 1974 amendments makes clear 
that Congress explicitly intended to eliminate any “duty to sit.”83  It is 
unclear whether, and to what extent, a perceived duty to sit affects 
district court judge recusal decisions; as has been noted, such 
decisions rarely appear in writing.  Only ten court of appeals 
decisions in the 1080-case sample studied noted the issue, and only 
one of the ten reversed the decision not to recuse. 
The issue remains current and important in the U.S. Supreme 
Court.  A Statement of Recusal Policy, issued by seven of the nine 
Justices in 1993, announced how each of the seven would assess 
issues presented when a relative was “‘an associate in the law firm 
representing one of the parties before this Court’ but has ‘not 
participated in the case before the Court or at previous stages of the 
litigation,’ . . . when the covered lawyer has participated in the case at 
an earlier stage of the litigation, or when the covered lawyer is a 
partner in a firm appearing before us.”84  The seven wrote, 
Even one unnecessary recusal impairs the functioning of the Court.  
. . .  In this Court, where the absence of one Justice cannot be made 
up by another, needless recusal deprives litigants of the nine 
Justices to which they are entitled, produces the possibility of an 
even division on the merits of the case, and has a distorting effect 
upon the certiorari process, requiring the petitioner to obtain (under 
 
80 See id. at 196. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., supra note 61, at 2. 
84 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, STATEMENT OF RECUSAL POLICY 1 (Nov. 
1, 1993). 
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our current practice) four votes out of eight instead of four out of 
nine.85 
Supreme Court Justices, in other words, continue to believe that they 
have a strong duty to sit that countervails a potential appearance of 
bias.  In declining to recuse himself in Cheney, Justice Scalia cited the 
foregoing language.86 
Section 455 does not itself set forth procedural rules.  Judges are 
expected to recuse themselves sua sponte, even if the parties do not 
object.87  Once recusal is in issue, the challenged judge decides for 
himself whether recusal is warranted.88  If a trial judge does not 
recuse himself, appellate review is available.  If a judge on a court of 
appeals declines to recuse himself, the moving party may have 
recourse, in theory, to the Supreme Court, but such recourse is never 
availed of in practice.  If a Justice of the Supreme Court declines to 
recuse himself, there is no recourse, even in theory.89  Very 
infrequently, some Supreme Court Justices do provide written 
explanations of their recusal decisions, but such explanations are not 
required.90 
III 
COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS AND UNCONSCIOUS BIAS 
We now know that humans often rely on mental shortcuts—
“heuristics”—to make complex decisions.91  Heuristics, although 
possibly hardwired, present themselves as rules of thumb, educated 
guesses, intuitive judgments, or simply common sense.  Reliance on 
heuristics facilitates efficient decision making, but it can also produce 
severe and systematic errors in judgment.92  The use of unconscious 
mental shortcuts to evaluate facts can create misperceptions—
”cognitive illusions”—which can then skew our decisions.93  
 
85 Id. at 1–2. 
86 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913, 915–16 (2004). 
87 Frost, supra note 5, at 548. 
88 Id. 
89 Hellman, supra note 67, at 203. 
90 Id. 
91 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128 (1974).  For a detailed description of this work, see 
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. 
eds., 1982). 
92 Marybeth Herald, Deceptive Appearances: Judges, Cognitive Bias, and Dress Codes, 
41 U.S.F. L. REV. 299, 304 (2007). 
93 Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001). 
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Cognitive illusions, like optical illusions, deceive us without our 
being fully aware that we are being deceived. 
Five common heuristics—and the cognitive illusions they cause—
influence decision making in law, as they do in all other fields of 
human endeavor: 
anchoring (making estimates based on irrelevant starting points); 
framing (treating economically equivalent gains and losses 
differently); hindsight bias (perceiving past events to have been 
more predictable than they actually were); the representativeness 
heuristic (ignoring important background statistical information in 
favor of individuating information); and [the unfortunately named] 
egocentric biases (overestimating one’s own abilities).94 
These are among the best-documented cognitive illusions in 
psychological literature. 
Studies have shown that judges are not immune to the effects of 
heuristics and the resulting cognitive illusions.95  In the recusal 
context, heuristics may be relevant at two levels.  First, judges need to 
be aware of how heuristics affect their substantive decision making.  
A judge unconsciously affected by cognitive illusions is less likely to 
render sound decisions.  In general, however, susceptibility to 
cognitive illusions is not likely to constitute grounds for recusal.  We 
all use heuristics.  Someone equally human will replace a judge who 
recuses himself on this ground.  Second, and more importantly, 
judges making recusal decisions, and those who worry about the law 
of judicial recusal need to be aware of how heuristics can bias a 
judge’s decision to recuse himself—or, more likely, not to recuse 
himself. 
Judges have published very few explanations about their decisions, 
and this makes illustrating the effects of these heuristics difficult.  
This Article examines three examples of explained recusals: Justice 
Scalia’s written memorandum defending his decision not to recuse 
himself in Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia;96 Justice Rehnquist’s written decision to sit in Laird v. 
Tatum,97 in which he ultimately cast the deciding vote; and Ninth 
 
94 Id. at 784. 
95 Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark 
for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 469, 497 (2005); see also Justin D. Levinson, 
Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE 
L.J. 345, 420 (2007) (concluding that implicit memory biases taint the legal decision-
making process). 
96 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913 (2004). 
97 Laird v. Tatum (Laird II), 409 U.S. 824 (1972). 
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Circuit Judge Stephen Reinhardt’s written decision not to recuse 
himself in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, one of the California gay 
marriage cases,98 which has not yet reached a conclusion. 
It is not my intention to be critical of the judges in question.  I use 
their writings because precious few alternatives exist.  Before setting 
forth how the various heuristics work and exploring how they might 
have operated in these three cases, it may be useful to set forth the 
facts underlying each of the three. 
Cheney v. United States District Court challenged the legality of 
the activities of an advisory committee on energy policy, the National 
Energy Policy Development Group, established by President George 
W. Bush and chaired by Vice President Richard Cheney.99  Two 
organizations, Judicial Watch, a nonprofit government watchdog 
group, and the Sierra Club, an environmentalist organization, alleged 
that the advisory committee had violated the Federal Advisory 
Committee Act (FACA) by not making public all the documents that 
it had generated.100 
FACA exempts committees composed entirely of federal 
officials.101  Judicial Watch and the Sierra Club argued that the 
exemption did not apply because private lobbyists had participated in 
the committee’s meetings—in other words, that the advisory 
committee on energy policy was meeting with private parties behind 
closed doors.102  Vice President Cheney and the committee asked the 
court to dismiss on the ground that FACA, thus construed, would 
violate the constitutional separation of powers by requiring judicial 
oversight of internal executive branch deliberations.103 
National media outlets prominently covered Cheney.104  Initially, 
legal scholars focused on the executive privilege issues presented by 
the case, and political pundits debated its potential impact on the Bush 
 
98 Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry IV), 630 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2011). 
99 Cheney II, 542 U.S. 367, 373 (2004). 
100 Id. at 373–74. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 374. 
103 Id. at 375. 
104 Timothy J. Goodson, Comment, Duck, Duck, Goose: Hunting for Better Recusal 
Practices in the United States Supreme Court in Light of Cheney v. United States District 
Court, 84 N.C. L. REV. 181, 182 (2005); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy 
Policy Dev. Grp., 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 25 (D.D.C. 2002); Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and 
the Supreme Court, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 657, 659 (2005) (stating the hunting trip caused a 
“loud—and sustained—outcry”). 
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administration.105  When Cheney reached the U.S. Supreme Court 
and Justice Scalia declined to recuse himself, however, the recusal 
issues overshadowed these substantive issues. 106 
In early January 2004, while Vice President Cheney’s appeal was 
pending before the Court, Justice Scalia, his son, and his son-in-law 
joined the Vice President on a duck-hunting trip to Louisiana.107  
Justice Scalia planned the trip before the Court had granted certiorari.  
According to Justice Scalia’s memorandum, on behalf of Justice 
Scalia’s friend, Wallace Carline, who was hosting the duck-hunting 
trip, Justice Scalia invited Vice President Cheney to participate.108  
After the Vice President accepted the invitation, it was agreed that 
Justice Scalia, his married son, and his son-in-law would fly with 
Vice President Cheney on his government jet.109  Justice Scalia 
purchased a round-trip, commercial airline ticket, but only used the 
return portion.110  There were thirteen hunters on the trip.111  Justice 
Scalia was never alone with Vice President Cheney, and they never 
discussed the case.112  Vice President Cheney left after two days of 
duck hunting, while Justice Scalia, his son, and his son-in-law stayed 
for four more days, returning to Washington on a commercial 
flight.113 
After Justice Scalia determined that recusal was not necessary, 
Sierra Club filed a motion to recuse Justice Scalia under 28 U.S.C. § 
 
105 Goodson, supra note 104, at 182; see also, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Duck-Blind 
Justice: Justice Scalia's Memorandum in the Cheney Case, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 229, 
232–33 (2004) (arguing that suing Cheney in his capacity as chair of the Energy Group 
regarding whether he lied about how the group was constituted “goes to Cheney’s 
‘reputation and integrity’ in the most significant way, and is of particular importance to 
him in an election year”); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege Revived?: Secrecy and 
Conflict During the Bush Presidency, 52 DUKE L.J. 403, 411–14 (2002) (discussing 
Cheney’s refusal to provide requested information to the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) and his claim that the GAO lacked the authority to seek information from the task 
force); Carolyn Bingham Kelló, Note, Drawing the Curtain on Open Government? In 
Defense of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 345, 392–93 (2003) 
(explaining that the public has a right to know when the President is making policy 
recommendations received from special interest groups so that it is able to participate in 
the democratic process). 
106 Goodson, supra note 104, at 182. 
107 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913, 914–15 (2004). 
108 Id. at 914. 
109 Id. at 914–15. 
110 Id. at 921. 
111 Id. at 915. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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455(a), asserting that the shared vacation created an appearance of 
partiality.114  The motion cited editorials calling for Justice Scalia’s 
recusal in twenty of the nation’s thirty largest newspapers as evidence 
of such an appearance.115  Denying the motion to recuse, Justice 
Scalia wrote a twenty-one-page memorandum in which he stated that 
going on a hunting trip with, and accepting transportation in a private 
jet from, a party then before the Court afforded no reasonable basis 
upon which to question his impartiality.116 
Laird v. Tatum challenged Defense Department surveillance of 
individuals who opposed the Vietnam War.117  Justice Rehnquist had 
served as the head of the Justice Department’s Office of Legal 
Counsel and played a part in assessing and approving the surveillance 
program.118  He appeared as a witness for the Justice Department 
during congressional hearings on that program.119  When Laird v. 
Tatum came before the Supreme Court in 1972, however, Justice 
Rehnquist refused to recuse himself, ultimately casting the deciding 
vote in favor of the surveillance program he had helped design and 
defend prior to his appointment to the Court.120 
Like Scalia, Justice Rehnquist felt compelled to explain his 
decision in writing.121  Writing a memorandum decision in Laird v. 
Tatum, and citing § 455, he asserted that he was never on record as 
counsel for the government in the case, was not a material witness in 
the case, did not have intimate knowledge of the evidence, and was 
totally disconnected from the issue while at the Department of 
Justice.122  He spent the majority of his opinion arguing that he did 
not fit into any of the specific categories of § 455(b) and that he did 
not have any actual bias on the merits.123 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, brought by two same-sex couples who 
had been denied licenses to marry, challenged the constitutionality of 
California’s Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution 
 
114 Motion to Recuse at 1–2, Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (No. 03-475). 
115 Id. at 3–4. 
116 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913. 
117 Laird v. Tatum (Laird I), 408 U.S. 1 (1972). 
118 Jeffrey W. Stempel, Completing Caperton and Clarifying Common Sense Through 
Using the Right Standard for Constitutional Judicial Recusal, 29 REV. LITIG. 249, 310 
(2010). 
119 Laird II, 409 U.S. 824, 824–25 (1972). 
120 Id. at 839; Laird I, 408 U.S. at 1. 
121 Laird II, 409 U.S. at 824. 
122 Id. at 826–29. 
123 Id. at 824. 
BUHAI 10/28/2011  10:29 AM 
2011] Federal Judicial Disqualification 87 
to provide that “[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman is valid 
or recognized in California.”124  The ACLU, among others, moved to 
allow various gay rights organizations to become parties to the 
lawsuit.  The district court denied its motion, and the ACLU did not 
appeal. 
On August 4, 2010, after a highly publicized trial, District Court 
Judge Vaughn Walker ruled that Proposition 8 violated the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.125  The Ninth Circuit stayed judgment pending 
appeal.126  Judges Stephen Reinhardt, Michael Daly Hawkins, and N. 
Randy Smith were assigned to hear the appeal on the merits.127  The 
Ninth Circuit heard oral arguments on December 6, 2010.128 
On January 4, 2011, the panel certified a question to the California 
Supreme Court.129  Because California officials had declined to 
defend the law, the panel asked the state court to decide whether the 
proponents of a challenged initiative had a “particularized interest in 
the initiative’s validity” that would permit them to defend the law 
when state officials refused to do so.130  The panel stayed the federal 
appeal itself pending the California Supreme Court’s response.131  On 
February 16, 2011, the California Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
Ninth Circuit’s question and heard oral arguments on September 6, 
2011.132  The district court’s judgment remains stayed, and no 
decision about the appeal on the merits is expected until after the 
California Supreme Court rules on the Ninth Circuit’s certified 
question. 
Judge Reinhardt’s wife, Ramona Ripston, was Executive Director 
of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Southern 
California until February 2011, when she retired.133  The ACLU 
advocates equal marriage rights for same-sex couples and, as noted, 
 
124 Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry I), 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927–28 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
125 Id. at 991–1003. 
126 Order on Motion for Stay Pending Appeal at 1, Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry III), 
630 F.3d 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 10-16696), 2010 WL 3212786. 
127 Perry III, 630 F.3d at 901. 
128 Id. at 898. 
129 Perry v. Schwarzenegger (Perry II), 628 F.3d 1191, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011). 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 1200. 
132 Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. S189476 (Cal. Feb. 16, 2011); Calendars—Supreme 
Court, CALIFORNIA COURTS, available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/2116.htm (last visited 
Sept. 20, 2011). 
133 Perry IV, 630 F.3d 909, 911 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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had unsuccessfully represented parties attempting to intervene in the 
Perry case.134  Judge Reinhardt concluded that, in such 
circumstances, recusal was not necessary.  Judge Reinhardt thus 
denied the defendant’s Motion to Disqualify.135 
In his memorandum, Judge Reinhardt conceded that § 455 would 
have required recusal where “a reasonable person with knowledge of 
all the facts would conclude that [my] impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned.”136  He represented that his wife’s views had no 
impact on his own views and ability to remain impartial, and he 
concluded, 
A reasonable person familiar with my judicial record throughout my 
career . . . would not reasonably believe that either my wife’s 
beliefs or her organization’s filings in the court below would play 
any role whatsoever in my handling of the present case.  I therefore 
decline to recuse myself under § 455(a).137 
Is it possible that heuristics interfered in the ability of Justice 
Scalia, Justice Rehnquist, or Judge Reinhardt to make objective 
decisions regarding their own recusal?  One of the most important 
recent studies of the effect of heuristics on judicial decision making 
was authored by Professor Chris Guthrie, Professor Jeffrey 
Rachlinski, and Judge Andrew Wistrich.  In Inside the Judicial Mind, 
the authors identify five heuristics as the most common and measured 
their influence on 167 magistrate judges.138  Of the five, three—
anchoring, hindsight bias, and egocentric bias—were found to affect 
judges as much as other decision makers.139  Those three are 
discussed in greater detail below.  The other two, framing and the 
representativeness heuristic, had an impact on judicial decision 
making, but less so than for the population in general.140  They are 
also less relevant to recusal issues. 
A.  Anchoring 
Anchoring affects numerical estimates.141  When a subject 
establishes an initial reference point (the “anchor”), regardless of how 
 
134 Id. at 913–14. 
135 Id. at 916. 
136 Id. at 911 (alteration in original). 
137 Id. at 916. 
138 Guthrie et al., supra note 93, at 787. 
139 Id. at 816. 
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 787–88. 
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irrelevant it is to what he is attempting to estimate, he tends to rely on 
that anchor when making his estimate.142  Once the anchor is set, 
there is inevitable bias.  For example, the list value of a house can 
influence how the seller, buyers, and other participants in the sale 
process estimate the fair market value of the house.  Reliance on an 
anchor may appear reasonable when anchors convey relevant 
information about the actual value of an item.  Problems arise, 
however, when anchors do not provide any information about the 
actual value of a number.  Even when they do convey relevant 
information, they can still bias judgment.143 
In an early study of anchoring described by Guthrie et al., 
participants were asked to estimate the percentage of African 
countries in the United Nations.144  Before asking for this estimate, 
the participants were informed that the number was either higher or 
lower than a numerical value identified by the arbitrary spin of a 
wheel.  Unknown to the participants, the wheel had been set to stop 
on either ten or sixty-five.145 
Even though the purportedly arbitrary initial values from the wheel 
were clearly irrelevant to the correct answer, the initial anchor values 
had a significant influence on the participants’ responses.  When the 
wheel landed on ten, the median estimate of the participants was 
twenty-five percent; when the wheel landed on sixty-five, the median 
estimate of the participants was forty-five percent.146  In other words, 
the initial arbitrary value had a clear anchoring effect on participants’ 
estimates, notwithstanding the fact that participants knew it to be 
arbitrary. 
Other studies have shown this same anchoring effect—as, for 
example, when subjects receive an absurdly high anchor number and 
then must estimate the price of a book (after first being asked if it was 
higher or lower than $7128.53) or the average temperature in San 
Francisco (after first being asked if it was higher or lower than 
558°F).147  Even when an anchor is patently absurd and provides no 
useful information, mentally testing the validity of the anchor causes 
 
142 See Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L.J. 420, 429 (2007). 
143 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or 
Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 96–97 (2000). 
144 See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 91, at 1128. 
145 See Guthrie et al., supra note 93, at 788. 
146 Rachlinski, supra note 143, at 97. 
147 Guthrie et al., supra note 93, at 788–89. 
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people to adjust their estimates upward or downward toward that 
anchor.148 
Litigation frequently produces anchors in settlement negotiations 
and damage awards.149  In civil cases, judges who participate in 
settlement negotiations may use numbers floated in such negotiations 
as anchors regardless of their validity.  This can result in biased 
damage awards.150  In criminal cases, sentencing recommendations—
however poorly grounded—are likely to serve as sentencing 
anchors.151  Neither is necessarily illegitimate; law can make 
constructive affirmative use of anchors to influence judicial decisions.  
But, if law’s goal is ultimately to measure actual damages, for 
example, anchors can unconsciously subvert that goal. 
Numerical estimates are only relevant to a small subset of recusal 
decisions.  But they were at least arguably relevant to Justice Scalia’s 
decision in Cheney.  Justice Scalia had accepted an item of value from 
one of the parties to an appeal pending before the Court—
transportation by private jet from Washington, D.C., to Patterson, 
Louisiana, for himself, his son, and his son-in-law.152  The value of 
that item was at least arguably relevant to the “appearance of 
partiality” standard of § 455(a).  That such value was relevant to 
Scalia’s decision not to recuse is evidenced by his concluding 
argument: “If it is reasonable to think that a Supreme Court Justice 
can be bought so cheap, the Nation is in deeper trouble than I had 
imagined.”153  Clearly, Justice Scalia had some belief regarding the 
gift’s value.  What was his belief?  And did anchoring bias possibly 
skew it? 
Key to his assessment of the value of the gift he had received were 
three anchors: that “[o]ur flight down cost the Government nothing” 
(value = zero), and that no one in his party “saved a cent by flying on 
the Vice President’s plane”154 (value = zero) because they had 
purchased round-trip tickets on a commercial flight (value ≈ 
$1350).155  The actual value of what he received, by contrast, was 
 
148 Id. at 788. 
149 Id. at 789. 
150 Id. at 793–94. 
151 See id. at 794. 
152 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913, 914–15 (2004). 
153 Id. at 929. 
154 Id. at 921. 
155 A search for flights from Washington, D.C., to New Orleans (the nearest major 
commercial airport to Patterson) suggests that the least expensive commercial round-trip 
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presumably not less than the cost of the flight properly allocated 
among the four passengers, three of whom were Justice Scalia and 
members of his family. 
Flights in private jets of course have a higher value than flights on 
commercial airlines.  As anyone who has ever flown on a commercial 
airline knows, modern commercial flights are at best a necessary evil.  
Those for whom money is no object hire private jets, which are far 
more comfortable, fly at the convenience of the passengers, and can 
land at small airports closer to the passengers’ ultimate destination.  
Gulfstream jets, like the one Justice Scalia and his family used, 
currently rent for about $4900 per hour.156  If one assumes six hours 
of rental,157 the total value of the flight in question would have been 
just under $30,000.  That value would then have to be allocated 
among the four passengers.  One might allocate the value on a no-
additional-cost basis, as Justice Scalia did.158  This would imply that 
Justice Scalia received no value whatever from the private flight, a 
proposition which seems implausible.  A more likely allocation would 
be pro rata, which would imply that Justice Scalia received a $22,000 
gift from a party scheduled to appear before him.159 
The point is not that Justice Scalia did anything wrong, or even that 
he received a larger gift than he acknowledged from a party scheduled 
to appear before him.  The point is rather that the Justice’s anchors 
might well have had an effect on his estimate of the gift’s value.  Had 
Justice Scalia not known the price of a commercial flight, had he 
known the cost of the flight to the government, or had he been given 
the prices that an average person would have bid for the privilege of 
 
flight is approximately $450.  See KAYAK, http://www.sidestep.com /flights/DCA-MSY 
/2011-09-30/2011-10-4 (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
156 See, e.g., New York Aviation Corporation, http://www.privatejetcharters.com 
/Charterprices.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
157 The plane in question presumably flew from Washington to Patterson and back.  The 
distance between Washington and Patterson is 1033 miles.  The Gulfstream’s rated 
cruising speed is 400 knots, see, e.g., New York Aviation Corporation, 
http://www.privatejetcharters.com/Charterprices.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2011), which 
equates to 460 miles per hour.  The actual flight at that speed (ignoring slower speeds for 
landing and takeoff) would therefore have taken about 2-1/4 hours.  Allowing for loading, 
takeoff, landing, and unloading, this suggests a one-way trip of about three hours. 
158 See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 132(a)(1) (2006). 
159 See, e.g., Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 2 U.S.C.A. § 
439a(c)(1)(B) (Supp. 2007–2008) (limiting the use of campaign funds for flight 
expenditures to the “pro rata share of the fair market value of such flight (as determined by 
dividing the fair market value of the normal and usual charter fare or rental charge for a 
comparable plane of comparable size by the number of candidates on the flight)”). 
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flying on the Vice President’s plane, he might have approached the 
problem of valuation quite differently.  Indeed, had he assumed that 
the gift was worth over $20,000, he might have come to a different 
conclusion about the possibility of an appearance of partiality. 
B.  Hindsight Bias 
Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to overestimate the 
predictability of past events.160  In other words, it makes the past 
seem more predictable than it actually was.  Hindsight bias occurs 
because learning an outcome causes people to update their beliefs 
about the world.161  People then rely on these new beliefs to generate 
retroactive estimates of what was predictable.162  In doing so, they 
ignore the fact that the outcome itself inspired the change in their 
beliefs.163  Consequently, they conclude that the actual outcome was 
more predictable or foreseeable than it actually was.164 
Hindsight bias is related to belief persistence, a phenomenon where 
people cannot ignore known information.165  It is important not to 
confuse hindsight bias with the process of simply learning from 
experience, which is perfectly rational.  Hindsight bias consists of 
using known outcomes to assess retroactively the predictability of 
something that has already happened. 
Assessing the predictability of past outcomes is pervasive in the 
law;166 it is therefore important to be aware of hindsight bias’ effect 
on legal liability.  For example, one study compared participants’ 
foresight and hindsight evaluations of whether failure to take 
precautions against a flood was negligent.167  Participants were 
instructed to find the defendant negligent if they believed a flood had 
a greater than ten percent chance of occurring in any given year.168 
Although both sets of participants reviewed identical information 
about the likelihood of a flood, the participants reached different 
 
160 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 
U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 571 (1998). 
161 Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The 
Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1269 (2005). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See Rachlinski, supra note 160, at 572. 
167 Id. at 589. 
168 Id. at 589–90. 
BUHAI 10/28/2011  10:29 AM 
2011] Federal Judicial Disqualification 93 
conclusions when some were told that a flood had in fact occurred 
and caused damage.169  Only twenty-four percent of foresight 
participants concluded that the likelihood of a flood justified liability 
for negligence, while fifty-seven percent of the hindsight participants 
concluded that the failure to take precautions was negligent.170  In 
other words, the decision to refrain from taking the precaution seemed 
reasonable to a majority of foresight participants, but seemed 
unreasonable to a majority of hindsight participants. 
In addition to negligence determinations, hindsight bias likely 
influences a decision not to suppress evidence for lack of probable 
cause (after the police actually find drugs during the search), claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel (after the defendant has actually 
been convicted), the levying of sanctions under Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (after the court has actually rejected a 
motion with respect to which Rule 11 sanctions are sought), and 
assessments of the liability of corporate officers for false predictions 
about their company’s performance (after the predictions actually fail 
to come true).  Thus, hindsight bias can pose dangers in many areas of 
law. 
Hindsight bias may have also affected Justice Scalia’s decision not 
to recuse himself in Cheney.  Under § 455(a), his recusal was required 
if his “impartiality might reasonably be questioned” by an objective 
person.171  He asserted that he had not had any opportunity to be 
alone with Cheney during the duck hunt.  Objective observers might 
or might not credit his assertion. 
One of the questions before him was whether a reasonable observer 
might in fact be reluctant to rely on his assertion, given the 
objectively verifiable facts.172  Knowing that the Justice had spent 
three hours on a plane with a party before him and two more days on 
a hunting trip, would a reasonable observer predict interactions 
between the two that might call the Justice’s impartiality into 
question?  Such interactions had not in fact occurred, the Justice 
 
169 Id. at 590. 
170 Id. 
171 See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006); see also Christopher Riffle, Note, Ducking Recusal: 
Justice Scalia's Refusal to Recuse Himself from Cheney v. United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 541 U.S. 913 (2004), and the Need for a Unique Recusal 
Standard for Supreme Court Justices, 84 NEB. L. REV. 650, 663–67 (2005) (noting that the 
recusal issue does not turn on whether a Justice can in fact decide a case impartially; 
rather, this statutory standard requires a Justice to recuse himself if his impartiality could 
“reasonably be questioned”). 
172 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913, 924 (2004). 
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asserted.173  Therefore, a reasonable, objective party would not 
predict them to occur. 
Hindsight bias may similarly have influenced Justice Rehnquist’s 
decision not to recuse himself in Laird.  An appearance of partiality 
depends in significant part on what an objective observer would 
predict to have happened behind the scenes based on what is 
objectively verifiable.  Justice Rehnquist asserted that he was not in 
fact of counsel or a material witness in the matter174 and that he had 
very little intimate knowledge of the underlying evidence.175  In 
effect, he asserted that he was not in fact biased. 
Application of an appearance-based standard, however, does not 
turn on whether the judge is in fact biased.  In applying such a 
standard, we do not want to have to credit or disbelieve a judge’s 
unsworn and unverifiable assertions of fact.  Predictions based on 
objectively verifiable evidence are essential to neutral application of 
such a standard.  Knowing what had actually happened behind the 
scenes likely affected Justice Rehnquist’s evaluation of what a 
reasonable observer would predict based on objectively verifiable 
evidence.  In short, hindsight bias affected the Justice’s evaluation. 
The same phenomenon may have affected Judge Reinhardt’s 
reasoning in Perry v. Schwarzenegger.  Again, an objective observer 
knew only that Judge Reinhardt’s wife’s organization had attempted 
to intervene on one side of the case.176  The “appearance of partiality” 
question was whether, based on the objectively verifiable facts, an 
objective observer might conclude that the judge’s wife’s views on 
the case before him might influence him.177  Whether he was in fact 
influenced is a conceptually distinct question.  Nevertheless, believing 
that he was not in fact influenced by his wife’s views may have 
affected Judge Reinhardt’s assessment of whether, based on the 
objectively verifiable facts, a reasonable observer might predict that 
he would be influenced. 
 
173 Id. at 915. 
174 Laird II, 409 US 824, 828 (1972). 
175 Id. at 826. 
176 See Perry IV, 630 F.3d 909, 911, 913 (9th Cir. 2011). 
177 Id. 
BUHAI 10/28/2011  10:29 AM 
2011] Federal Judicial Disqualification 95 
C.  Egocentric Bias 
The unfortunately named “egocentric bias” is the final cognitive 
illusion identified and studied by Guthrie et al.178  As they explain: 
People tend to make judgments about themselves and their abilities 
that are “egocentric” or “self-serving.”  People routinely estimate, 
for example, that they are above average on a variety of desirable 
characteristics, including health, driving, professional skills, and 
likelihood of having a successful marriage.  Moreover, people 
overestimate their contribution to joint activities. . . .  [For 
example], when married couples are asked to estimate the 
percentage of household tasks they perform, their estimates 
typically add up to more than 100%.179 
The egocentric bias is famously exemplified by the closing phrase 
from the radio show, A Prairie Home Companion, News from Lake 
Wobegon: “Where all the women are strong, all the men are good-
looking and all the children are above average.”180  Egocentric biases 
appear for many reasons.  Again as explained by Guthrie et al.: 
First, of course, is self-presentation.  People may not really believe 
that they are better than average, but they will nonetheless tell 
researchers that they are.  Second, people engage in confirmatory 
mental searches for evidence that supports a theory they want to 
believe, such as that their marriage will succeed.  They have no 
comparable data on the nature of strangers’ marriages, so the only 
evidence they find suggests that theirs is more likely than others’ to 
be successful.  Third, memory is egocentric in that people 
remember their own actions better than others’ actions.  Thus, when 
asked to recall the percentage of housework they perform, people 
remember their own contribution more easily and, consequently 
tend to overestimate it.  Finally, many of the constructs involved in 
egocentric biases are ambiguous, and thus, people can define 
success differently.  For example, safe driving means different 
things to different people, and as a result, everyone really can drive 
safer than average, at least as measured by their own standards.181 
Egocentric biases can have a negative influence on the litigation 
process.  “[L]itigants and their lawyers might overestimate their own 
abilities, the quality of their advocacy, and the relative merits of their 
cases.”182  Consequently, they may be unrealistically unwilling to 
settle.  As a result, egocentric biases can lead to bargaining impasse 
 
178 See Guthrie et al., supra note 93, at 811–12. 
179 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
180 Am. Pub. Media, A PRAIRIE HOME COMPANION WITH GARRISON KEILLOR, 
http://prairiehome.publicradio.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2011). 
181 Guthrie et al., supra note 93, at 812 (footnotes omitted). 
182 Id. at 812–13. 
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and wasteful litigation.  Like litigants and lawyers, judges may also 
be inclined to interpret information in ways consistent with this 
bias.183 
For example, judges in one study routinely and significantly 
underestimated the likelihood that they would be overturned on 
appeal.184  The judges were asked to assess how likely they were to 
be reversed on appeal.185  Even though their responses were 
anonymous, they still exhibited egocentric bias.186  In fact, as 
reported by Guthrie et al., 56.1% of the judges put themselves in the 
lowest quarter of reversal rates.187  Because the responses were 
anonymous, it seems that that the egocentric bias appeared more 
likely because of the second or third reasons: lack of comparative data 
or the egocentric memory. 
Egocentric bias may lead judges to believe that they are better 
decision makers than is really the case; this may interfere with the 
performance of their jobs.  “For example, a federal district judge can 
grant an interlocutory appeal only if she is willing to concede that she 
has issued a ruling on a matter of law ‘as to which there is substantial 
ground for difference of opinion.’”188  Thus, a litigant seeking to 
persuade a judge to grant an interlocutory appeal must convince her 
that another judge could easily disagree with her ruling.189  
Egocentric bias likely makes it difficult for litigants to convince 
federal judges that they might have been wrong.  More generally, 
egocentric biases may make it hard for judges to recognize that they 
can and do make mistakes.190 
At the same time, egocentric biases can be personally and socially 
beneficial.  Psychologists argue that having a somewhat inflated 
belief in one’s abilities helps maintain one’s morale and ensures a 
healthy sense of well-being.191  Society surely prefers its judges to be 
resolute and self-assured rather than timid and insecure.192  Although 
egocentric beliefs may induce judges to see the world in a self-serving 
 
183 Id. at 813. 
184 Id. at 813–14. 
185 Id. at 813. 
186 Id. at 814. 
187 Id. 
188 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994)). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. 
192 Id. 
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fashion, the justice system as a whole may ultimately be better off as 
a result.193 
Nevertheless, egocentric bias may make it difficult for judges to 
decide objectively whether they can act impartially in a particular 
case.  Unfortunately, accusing a judge of “egocentric bias” seems 
particularly impolitic.  And, unlike anchoring and hindsight bias, this 
bias likely affects every decision made by a judge about himself—in 
other words, it likely affects every federal recusal decision.  For use in 
federal court, we may need a less pejorative term—perhaps “self-
confidence bias.” 
In any event, such a bias may have played a part in leading Justice 
Scalia to conclude that he could remain impartial in a case involving a 
longtime friend.  Perhaps in response to this concern, the Justice 
emphasized that Vice President Cheney, although a named party in 
the case, was named in his official capacity as a federal officer—Vice 
President of the United States and Chairman of the National Energy 
Policy Development Group—and that the defendant did not seek 
relief against his friend personally, but against the government.194  He 
then went on to observe that if some other person were to become 
head of that committee or to obtain custody of the committee’s 
documents, the plaintiffs would name that person, and his friend 
would be dismissed as a named party.195 
In its Motion to Recuse, Sierra Club asserted that “because [Vice 
President Cheney’s] own conduct is central to this case, the Vice 
President’s reputation and his integrity are on the line.”196  At issue in 
the case was whether the committee had met ex parte with parties 
having an interest in energy policy.  Such would be a violation of 
federal law and would at least arguably reflect on the Vice President’s 
conduct.197  Justice Scalia strongly disagreed; the case, he asserted, 
was “a run-of-the-mill legal dispute about an administrative decision” 
and “[n]othing this Court says on those subjects will have any bearing 
upon the reputation and integrity of Richard Cheney.”198 
Perhaps.  At issue, however, was whether Justice Scalia would be 
able to disregard his friendship with Vice President Cheney and 
 
193 Id. 
194 Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913, 918 (2004). 
195 Id. 
196 Motion to Recuse at 9, Cheney I, 541 U.S. 913 (2004) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
197 Cheney I, 541 U.S. at 919 & n.1. 
198 Id. at 918–19. 
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separate the man from the office.  The media had prominently 
featured the Cheney case with many commentators criticizing the 
Vice President and the committee.  Many viewed the case as 
reflecting on Mr. Cheney personally.  At issue, moreover, was 
whether a reasonable person could reasonably question Justice 
Scalia’s impartiality, not whether Justice Scalia could actually 
disregard that friendship.  Cognitive illusions with regard to his own 
abilities—or egocentric bias—may well have affected his answer to 
both questions. 
Please note that nothing in the foregoing paragraphs is intended to 
suggest that Justice Scalia is abnormal in any way.  We all suffer 
from egocentric bias.  It is psychologically healthy to do so.  The 
point is rather that egocentric bias may make it impossible for judges 
to reliably resolve recusal motions with regard to themselves in a 
manner consistent with the standards of § 455, regardless of how 
intelligent, careful, and well intentioned they may be.  Review by 
others is essential, and we should predict that cases involving grounds 
implicating possible egocentric bias should result in higher reversal 
rates than those that do not. 
Judge Reinhardt, similarly, may have overestimated his ability to 
separate himself from his wife’s views.  This may have led him to an 
unrealistic assessment of whether his participation in Perry might 
create an appearance of impartiality.  Given his wife’s level of 
participation in California Proposition 8 issues, a reasonable person 
might well question Judge Reinhardt’s impartiality.  He stated, “The 
views are hers, not mine, and I do not in any way condition my 
opinion on the positions she takes regarding any issues.”199  Perhaps.  
It remains possible, however, that a psychologically healthy level of 
self-confidence caused him to underestimate his wife’s influence on 
his views. 
What happens when a judge’s recusal decisions are reviewed by 
others?  The hope is that review will be more objective, less affected 
by the heuristics described above. 
IV 
STUDY OF RECUSAL APPEALS FROM 1980 TO 2007 
Researchers searched the relevant files on Lexis and Westlaw for 
U.S. court of appeals decisions between 1980 and 2007, inclusive, in 
 
199 Perry IV, 630 F.3d 909, 916 (9th Cir. 2011). 
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which variants of the words or phrases “recusal,” “disqualification,” 
“28 U.S.C. § 144,” and “28 U.S.C. § 455” were used.  The 
researchers then read and coded the resulting cases by circuit, grounds 
asserted for recusal or disqualification, district court judge, outcome, 
whether the parties raised the recusal issue prior to judgment, and 
whether the case was civil or criminal.  Cases cited within any such 
cases, if issued within the period studied, were also read and, if 
relevant, included in the study.  All cases included in the study were 
read at least twice by different research assistants.  I sampled their 
work for quality control purposes. 
A.  Basic Data 
The study found 1080 appeals in which at least one ground asserted 
on appeal was the refusal by a district court judge to recuse himself.  
Reversals without remand for further proceedings on the recusal issue 
and remands for further proceedings on that issue were both relatively 
low.  Total dispositions were as follows: 
  Affirmed 952 88.1% 
  Reversed 88 8.1% 
  Remanded 40 3.7% 
  Total 1080 
This total sample was divided almost evenly between civil and 
criminal cases: 505 civil and 575 criminal.  Reversal rates on the 
recusal issue in criminal cases were somewhat higher.  Dispositions 
of appeals from failure to recuse in civil cases were as follows: 
  Affirmed 434 85.9% 
  Reversed 52  10.3% 
  Remanded 19 3.8% 
  Total 505 
The corresponding figures for criminal cases were as follows: 
  Affirmed 518 90.1% 
  Reversed 36 6.3% 
  Remanded 21 3.7% 
  Total 575 
Motions to recuse were sought prior to judgment in 750 of the 
1080 cases.  The remaining 330 challenges were sought after 
judgment.  The timing of the motion did not seem to affect disposition 
rates.  Dispositions of the pre-judgment motions were as follows: 
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  Affirmed 659 87.9% 
  Reversed 65 8.7% 
  Remanded 26 3.5% 
  Total 750 
The corresponding figures for post-judgment motions to recuse 
were as follows: 
  Affirmed 293 88.8% 
  Reversed 23 7.0% 
  Remanded 14 4.2% 
  Total 330 
Pre-judgment motions to recuse were more common in criminal 
cases: 
   Civil Criminal 
  Pre-judgment 63.0% 76.8% 
  Post-judgment 37.0% 23.2% 
Between 1980 and 2000, the number of appeals heard per year 
from refusals to recuse stayed relatively constant.  Beginning in 2001, 
the number of such appeals spiked and thereafter varied considerably 
from year to year.  The cause of this change is unclear. 
 
Fig. 1.  Appeals from Refusals to Recuse. 
Although the number of appeals changed significantly in 2001, the 
number of reversals and remands did not increase.  In effect, the latter 
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part of the study period saw a spike only in the number of 
unsuccessful appeals.  Again, the cause is unclear. 
 
Fig. 2.  Outcomes by Year. 
Over the entire twenty-eight-year period, however, outcomes did 
vary markedly among circuits: 
Circuit Cases Affirmed Reversed Remanded 
 1st 53 77.4% 17.0% 5.7% 
 2d 82 89.0% 6.1% 4.9% 
 3d 72 72.2% 20.8% 6.9% 
 4th 49 91.8% 4.1% 4.1% 
 5th 130 77.7% 20.0% 2.3% 
 6th 99 91.9% 3.0% 5.1% 
 7th 101 87.1% 9.9% 3.0% 
 8th 103 94.2% 4.9% 1.0% 
 9th 151 95.4% 2.0% 2.6% 
 10th 108 94.4% 1.9% 3.7% 
 11th 90 88.9% 6.7% 4.4% 
  D.C. 20 90.0% 10.0% 0.0% 
Federal 22 90.9% 0.0% 9.1% 
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 Fig. 3.  Outcomes by Circuit. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.  Reversal Rates by Circuit. 
 
In sum, there appear to have been substantial geographic disparities 
in reversal rates among the various circuits.  No explanation based on 
the data collected in the study presents itself.  One possibility is that 
different circuits applied different standards of review in recusal 
cases.  The culture of deference to the target judge’s evaluation of his 
own ability to remain impartial may have differed from circuit to 
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circuit.  Another possible explanation is that the district courts in the 
different circuits used different standards when balancing recusal 
grounds against the duty to sit.  Either explanation reinforces a 
concern that current law is too indeterminate and leaves too much to 
the discretion of the courts—to the district court judges making 
recusal decisions in the first instance, to the circuit court judges 
reviewing those decisions, or to both.  Recusal standards should be 
effectively national in their application.  The data suggest that this is 
not yet so. 
B.  Grounds Asserted 
Coders initially identified eighteen categories of grounds asserted 
for recusal and one (necessity) for denying recusal.  All studied cases 
were coded by ground.  In many cases, the parties asserted more than 
one ground for recusal.  Researchers coded each case for all asserted 
grounds.  The grounds coded were as follows: 
1. Financial Interest (General): Judge has a monetary interest in 
the outcome of the case. 
2. Financial Interest (Stock): Judge or an immediate family 
member is a stockholder of corporation that is a party. 
3. General Bias Against Counsel: Judge is or has been biased 
against counsel or in favor of the adverse counsel during current or 
past proceedings (including during prior employment). 
4. General Bias Against a Party: Judge is or has been biased 
against a party or in favor of the adverse party during current or past 
proceedings (including during prior employment). 
5. Racial Bias Against Counsel: Judge is or has been racially 
biased against counsel during current or past proceedings. 
6. Racial Bias Against a Party: Judge is or has been racially 
biased against a party during current or past proceedings. 
7. Prejudicial or Biased Statements: Judge made a statement that 
was prejudicial or biased during current or past proceedings. 
8. Professional Relationship with Counsel: Judge has a current or 
past professional relationship with counsel, counsel’s firm, or 
someone with an interest in the suit. 
9. Professional Relationship with a Party: Judge has a current or 
past professional relationship with a party, a party’s associate, or 
someone with an interest in the suit. 
10. Personal Relationship with Counsel: Judge has a current or past 
personal relationship (biological or otherwise) with counsel or 
someone with an interest in the suit. 
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11. Personal Relationship with a Party: Judge has a current or past 
personal (biological or otherwise) relationship with a party or 
someone with an interest in the suit. 
12. Ex parte Communications: Judge communicated with a party 
off the record and without notice to the other party. 
13. Adverse Rulings: Judge has ruled against a party in current or 
past proceedings. 
14. Personal Passion: Judge has strong ethical or social convictions 
about an issue in the case. 
15. Rule of Necessity: Despite judge’s interest, he must hear a case 
because no other forum is available to party. 
16. Witness or Party in a Proceeding: Judge has been or could be a 
witness or party in a past or future related proceeding. 
17. Knowledge of a Party or Disputed Evidence: Judge has 
extrajudicial knowledge of the party (e.g., from the media) or judge 
has or is presiding at a trial related to the same or similar matter. 
18. Procedural Dismissal or Remand of a Party’s Claim: The judge 
dismissed a party’s claim on procedural grounds (e.g., untimely 
motion). 
19. Legal Prohibition: The judge is legally prohibited from hearing 
the case. 
One would expect at least three factors to contribute to the 
frequency of each of these grounds and its success rate.  First, 
objectively, different grounds for recusal arise at different rates.  On 
the one hand, it is probably relatively uncommon for judges to be 
potential witnesses in cases to which they have been assigned 
(Ground 6).  On the other hand, it may be very common for judges to 
know counsel in the case (Grounds 3, 8, and 10).  Second, trial judges 
probably recuse themselves at different rates based on different 
asserted grounds.  One would expect the stock ownership rules to be 
largely self-enforcing (Ground 1).  One might, by contrast, expect 
very few judges to recuse themselves on an explicit admission of 
racial bias (Grounds 5 and 6).  Third, attorneys probably assert 
different grounds for appeal at different rates.  The data set does not 
include data that would permit exploration of these issues.  All the 
current data set tells us is how many cases asserting each ground have 
been decided and what their dispositions were. 
 A summary of the results follows: 
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  Cases Reverse Remand 
1 Financial Interest (General) 35 5.7% 2.9% 
2 Financial Interest (Stock) 26 11.5% 3.8% 
3 General Bias Against Counsel 90 16.7% 2.2% 
4 General Bias Against a Party 455 7.7% 3.3% 
5 Racial Bias Against Counsel 4 0.0% 0.0% 
6 Racial Bias Against a Party 25 4.0% 4.0% 
7 Prejudicial or Biased 
 Statements 314 9.6% 4.5% 
8 Professional Relationship 
 with Counsel 57 14.0% 1.8% 
9 Professional Relationship 
 with a Party 125 7.2% 3.2% 
10 Personal Relationship with 
 Counsel 37 16.2% 2.7% 
11 Personal Relationship with 
 a Party 53 9.4% 7.5% 
12 Ex parte Communications 80 12.5% 5.0% 
13 Adverse Rulings 286 3.1% 2.8% 
14 Personal Passion 27 11.1% 7.4% 
15 Rule of Necessity 10 10.0% 10.0% 
16 Witness or Party in a 
 Proceeding 30 6.7% 0.0% 
17 Knowledge of a Party or 
 Disputed Evidence 191 7.3% 3.7% 
18 Procedural Dismissal or 
 Remand 118 0.8% 5.1% 
19 Legal Prohibition 26 19.2% 3.8% 
For a better sense of when appellate courts are more or less willing 
to second-guess a trial judge’s recusal decision, it may be useful to 
reorder the same data in order of reversal rates: 
  Cases Reverse Remand 
19 Legal Prohibition 26 19.2% 3.8% 
 3 General Bias Against Counsel 90 16.7% 2.2% 
10 Personal Relationship with 
 Counsel 37 16.2% 2.7% 
 8 Professional Relationship 
  with Counsel 57 14.0% 1.8% 
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  Cases Reverse Remand 
12 Ex parte Communications 80 12.5% 5.0% 
 2 Financial Interest (Stock) 26 11.5% 3.8% 
14 Personal Passion  27 11.1% 7.4% 
 7 Prejudicial or Biased 
 Statements 314 9.6% 4.5% 
11 Personal Relationship with 
 a Party 53 9.4% 7.5% 
 4 General Bias Against a Party 455 7.7% 3.3% 
17 Knowledge of a Party or 
 Disputed Evidence 191 7.3% 3.7% 
 9 Professional Relationship 
 with a Party 125 7.2% 3.2% 
16 Witness or Party in a 
 Proceeding 30 6.7% 0.0% 
 1 Financial Interest (General) 35 5.7% 2.9% 
 6 Racial Bias Against a Party 25 4.0% 4.0% 
13 Adverse Rulings 286 3.1% 2.8% 
18 Procedural Dismissal or 
 Remand 118 0.8% 5.1% 
 5 Racial Bias Against Counsel 4 0.0% 0.0% 
It is not surprising that appellate courts appear to feel comfortable 
enforcing legal prohibitions against district court judges.  What does 
seem a bit surprising is that district court judges do not enforce these 
same prohibitions against themselves without supervision. 
The second set of grounds, ranked in order of reversal rates, all 
relate to the judge’s relationship with counsel—friendly or unfriendly.  
If egocentric bias affects a judge’s ability to assess objectively 
whether he can function impartially notwithstanding a particularly 
friendly or unfriendly relationship with counsel for one side or the 
other, we would expect the same high reversal rates for all three 
grounds.  And, indeed, we find them. 
Two further grounds—ex parte communications and stock 
interests—involve issues easily amenable to objective resolution.  
Here, appellate courts do not have to second-guess judgments made 
by judges about themselves.  Both grounds involve allegations 
amenable to objective resolution.  Again, it is not surprising that 
appellate courts are comfortable enforcing these grounds against 
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district judges.  And again, it is surprising that district judges give 
them any opportunity to do so. 
Four grounds relating to the judge’s relationship with one party or 
another exhibit clustered reversal rates ranging from 7.2% to 9.4%.  
The fact that their reversal rates are clustered suggests that the four 
raise common issues—perhaps, again, a common concern that the 
district court judge has overestimated his ability to set aside personal 
relationships.  Less clear is why a judge’s relationship to one of the 
parties appears less likely to trigger appellate reversal than his 
relationship with counsel.  Two explanations are apparent.  First, 
appellate judges may be more insistent on maintaining an appearance 
of impartiality within the legal community.  In other words, they may 
be more concerned about what their peers in practice think than about 
what the public in general thinks.  Second, it may simply be that, 
objectively, the kinds of relationships that trigger counsel-based 
motions to recuse are on average closer than the kinds of relationship 
that trigger party-based motions to recuse.  If so, applying the same 
standards to each might trigger higher reversal rates when counsel-
based motions are denied. 
Finally, the grounds least likely to trigger reversal are allegations 
of racial bias or complaints that the judge has previously ruled against 
the party.  Neither finding is surprising.  One would expect counsel to 
be hesitant to allege racial bias in a recusal motion.  One would 
expect the judge in question to resist admitting such bias.  And one 
would expect that appellate courts, even if inclined to reverse a 
refusal to recuse, would strain to rest that reversal on some other 
ground.  Similarly, it is black letter law that prior adverse rulings by a 
judge do not, by themselves, warrant recusal.200 
In sum, the data suggest that cognitive illusions do play a role in 
federal recusal decisions.  Admitting to bias toward counsel or parties 
seems to be harder than admitting to more objective disqualifying 
factors.  For a judge to admit that he or she cannot put aside personal 
feelings appears to be particularly difficult.  To do so might require 
that he or she acknowledge inability to comply which the judicial oath 
in a particular case.  We would expect the egocentric bias to make 
such an admission difficult.  This does not reflect poorly on judges.  It 
merely means that judges are human, too.  The Supreme Court, in 
Caperton, reasoned that in structuring legal decision-making 
mechanisms and assessing their legitimacy, we must make “realistic 
 
200 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judges § 154 (2011). 
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appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness.”201  No 
judge should take such an appraisal personally. 
C.  Reversal Rates 
The cases studied reflect a reversal rate of 8.1 %—6.3% in civil 
cases and 10.3% in criminal cases.  It may be useful to place this rate 
in context.  Recent studies have shown that reversal rates vary 
dramatically from one area of the law to another and vary further and 
equally dramatically depending on the identity of the party bringing 
the appeal.  A study by Professors Clermont, Eisenberg, and Schwab 
regarding civil judgment reversal rates in U.S. courts of appeal 
between 1987 and 2000 found an average reversal rate of 32.79% 
where the defendant brought the appeal and an average reversal rate 
of 11.85% where the plaintiff brought the appeal.202 
Breaking all such cases into subject-matter categories, the study 
found that defendants obtained reversal at rates as high as 50.33% in 
cases involving “other civil rights,” 42.19% in employment cases, 
42.05% in prisoner civil rights cases, 36.36% in securities and 
commodities cases, and at rates as low as 20.59% in FELA (railroad 
workman’s compensation) cases.203  Plaintiffs, by contrast, obtained 
reversal at rates as high as 37.50% in cases involving negotiable 
instruments and 26.67% in securities and commodities cases and at 
rates as low as 8.15% in motor vehicle cases, 6.87% in employment 
cases, 6.15% in habeas cases, and 5.75% in cases involving prisoners’ 
civil rights.204 
Unfortunately, cases in the present study were not coded to reflect 
whether the appeal was brought by plaintiff or defendant.  Even if all 
civil recusal appeals were brought by plaintiffs, however, the reversal 
rate for recusal decisions in civil cases—6.3%—was well below the 
average reversal rate for all cases appealed by plaintiffs to U.S. courts 
of appeals.  The question that most obviously begs for an answer is: 
Why? 
At least three answers suggest themselves.  First, judges may err in 
the direction of over-recusal.  Failure to recuse is appealable and may 
result in the embarrassment of reversal.  A decision to recuse is not 
 
201 Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2265 (2009). 
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appealable and therefore does not present the same risk.  If trial 
judges tend to over-recuse, we would expect lower reversal rates on 
appeal.  Second, parties may appeal recusal decisions with greater 
abandon and less attention to their likely success than other decisions.  
Recusal appeals are commonly added to appeals on other grounds.  
Adding appeal of a decision not to recuse may be relatively costless.  
A simple test of this hypothesis would be to compare appeal rates—
the rates at which parties appeal recusal decisions—with the rates at 
which they appeal other decisions.  Unfortunately, data are 
unavailable on the counts of unappealed district court recusal 
decisions. 
Third, low reversal rates may simply reflect appellate deference to 
trial court recusal decisions.  This third explanation is consistent with 
the finding that reversal rates vary dramatically from circuit to circuit.  
Different circuits may have different cultures of deference.  If true, 
this would be disturbing for at least two reasons.  First, federal law 
should be uniform.  Second, because we have reason to believe that 
judges are less likely to be able to make recusal decisions objectively, 
deference seems less appropriate in the recusal context than it might 
in other contexts. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the empirical study reported in this article is preliminary, 
it does suggest possible improvements to federal recusal law are 
necessary. 
First, the study suggests that it may be helpful for appellate courts 
to emphasize that § 455 is implicated even if no actual bias exists 
whenever, on the basis of the objectively verifiable facts, the judge’s 
“impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”  Although § 455(a) 
explicitly adopts an appearance-based standard, judges may, because 
of ordinary human cognitive illusions, find it difficult to distinguish 
fact from appearance when assessing their own behavior.  Indeed, 
they may find it difficult to admit even the possibility of an 
appearance of bias.  A fully enforced appearance-based standard 
might mitigate these distortions.  Preliminary as the present study 
may be, it does suggest that recusal grounds implicating egocentric 
bias raise particularly difficult problems for both trial judges and their 
appellate supervisors. 
Second, it would be helpful for appellate courts to emphasize that, 
at least in U.S. district courts and courts of appeal, there is no “duty to 
sit.”  Like other highly motivated professionals, judges may feel 
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pressure to avoid recusal because they do not want to create the 
impression that they are unable or unwilling to do their jobs.  A 
perceived pressure to perform should not get in the way of objective 
self-assessment. 
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court, as a Court, should develop and 
adopt rules governing the application of § 455 to individual Justices.  
Ideally, a mechanism for review should exist.  Supreme Court Justices 
are no more immune to cognitive illusions in assessing their own 
ability to rule impartially than judges on any other court.  If the 
Supreme Court is unwilling or unable to develop such rules and 
procedures, Congress should do it for them.  Perceived legitimacy of 
Supreme Court decisions is at least as important as perceived 
legitimacy of lower court decisions.  It may be true that decisions by 
fewer than nine Justices are suboptimal.  It may also be true that 
Supreme Court Justices cannot easily be replaced.  But these factors 
are not nearly as important as ensuring the perceived legitimacy of the 
decisions the Court does make.  If Justices of the Supreme Court are 
seen to be bending the recusal rules, lower court judges are likely to 
do so as well.  “Do as I say, not as I do” does not work any better in 
the law than it does in familial or other contexts.205 
Some argue that Supreme Court Justices should be subject to a 
more lenient recusal standard because of the nature of the cases they 
generally consider.  Justice Scalia noted that if judges were required 
to recuse themselves from any case involving an issue with which 
they had a political connection, there would be few cases left in which 
they would not have a conflict.206  This is not, however, a convincing 
reason to allow Justices to sit despite their outside activities and 
connections.  It is rather a compelling reason to limit such activities 
and connections.  What Justice Scalia never addressed was whether 
he should have gone on vacation with Vice President Cheney at all 
once it became clear that the Vice President was party to a case before 
him. 
The Federal Code of Conduct for Judges currently requires judges 
“to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”207  It advises federal 
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judges to avoid political conduct and expression.208  Neither of these 
sections applies to Justices of the Supreme Court.  If the Federal Code 
of Conduct for Judges were to apply in full to the Supreme Court, it 
might become less problematic to apply an appearance-of-bias 
standard to that Court as well.  The perceived legitimacy of its 
decisions would likely improve.  As Erwin Chemerinsky notes, 
“Codes of judicial ethics require that judges avoid even the 
appearance of impropriety.  Nowhere is that more important than for 
the most visible court in the country—the U.S. Supreme Court.”209 
The current Court may be called upon to decide whether the 
recently passed health care law withstands constitutional scrutiny.210  
Justice Kagan and Justice Thomas have both been pressured to 
disqualify themselves from any healthcare litigation.  Were they 
subject to the same appearance-of-impropriety standard applicable to 
lower court judges, it is possible that both Justices would be required 
to do so.  Justice Kagan may have had involvement in the health care 
legislation while working in the Obama administration.211  She has 
stated that “she attended at least one meeting where the existence of 
the litigation was briefly mentioned, but none where any substantive 
discussion of the litigation occurred.”212  The question should be, 
how would an objective observer assess her likely impartiality based 
on the objectively verifiable facts? 
Justice Thomas’s impartiality in the health care cases has similarly 
been called into question because his wife, Ginny Thomas, has served 
as a paid lobbyist against the legislation.213  Moneys earned by his 
wife presumably accrue to his benefit as well.  Again, the question 
should be, how would an objective observer assess his likely 
impartiality based on the objectively verifiable facts?  If both Justices 
Thomas and Kagan were to recuse themselves, the Court would be 
down to seven Justices.  This still constitutes a quorum.  A decision 
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by seven Justices would likely be viewed as at least as legitimate as a 
decision by nine, of whom two are under possible recusal clouds.  
Even if there should come a time when the Supreme Court could not 
hear a case because of a lack of quorum, or a time where it ends up 
with a tied decision, it would be preferable to allow the underlying 
circuit court opinions to stand than to release an opinion that creates 
the appearance of bias.  The underlying court opinion would probably 
not stand forever, as Supreme Court Justices are not immortal and a 
new Court could hear a similar case in the future. 
A worse scenario would be for one of the two potentially biased 
Justices to recuse himself or herself while the other heard the case, if 
the decision of the non-recused Justice made a difference in the 
substantive outcome.  Equally bad would be the perception of 
logrolling within the Court: “I’ll recuse myself if you do the same.”  
What is needed, and soon, is further objective guidance—in the form 
either of Supreme Court rules or legislation.  In the long run, realistic 
procedures for the federal appellate review of recusal decisions, 
including recusal decisions by Justices of the Supreme Court, would 
probably improve the legitimacy of appellate decisions.  Whether 
such procedures can be adopted by rule or require further legislation 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
In the meantime, it would be helpful for judges to provide a written 
explanation of every recusal or refusal to recuse.  In our system, 
precedent creates law, even when rulemakers are unable or unwilling 
to write rules.  A body of written explanations would begin to 
constrain the discretion judges currently appear to have. 
Our court system will maintain its power only so long as the people 
believe in the impartiality of its judges.  The history of judicial 
recusal in this country is a history of ever more specific standard 
setting.  The job is not yet done. 
